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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

RONALD RICHARD RODRIGUES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070741-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant/Defendant Ronald Richard Rodrigues timely appeals from an Amended
Restitution Order issued following judgment and transfer to the Board of Pardons. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2008) (formerly
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002)). The original judgment is in Addendum A. The
sentencing order issued by the trial court ten days after judgment is also in Addendum A.
The Amended Restitution Order from which Rodrigues is appealing is in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
Issue I: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 30(b) or the restitution statute to increase the amount of restitution after the
court entered judgment and Rodrigues began serving his prison sentence where the state
realized after sentencing that it had requested an incorrect complete restitution amount?

Standard of Review. While restitution decisions are generally reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, see State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332,1J6, 170 P.3d 1141 (citations
omitted), the question of whether a trial court has jurisdiction to increase restitution after
judgment has been entered and jurisdiction has been transferred to the Board of Pardons
involves a question of law. Sec id.; State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ^6, 63 P.3d 667;
Decker v. Rolfe, 2008 UT App 70, ^[8, ___ P.3d ___. And, when a determination of
c;t

|w]hethcr a restitution [award] is proper . . . depends solely upon interpretation of the

governing statute,^ this Court applies a correction of the error standard of review.
Miller, 2007 UT App 332, *|[6 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
Preservation. Defense counsel objected to the trial court increasing the restitution
amount, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction. R. 127:19-20, 24, 28. This
issue was therefore preserved below. Even if it had not been preserved, however, this
Court could review the issue under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) and also
because a question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time. £5ee Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e);
State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, <|[96, 137 P.3d 726.
Issue II. Whether the trial court violated state and federal protections against
double jeopardy when it increased Rodrigues' sentence by increasing the restitution order
after the trial court entered final judgment which included a final restitution order and
Rodrigues had begun serving his sentence?
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law. See Holm, 2006 UT
31,1|10. 137 P.3d 726; State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103,1fl[21-24, 104 P.3d 1250.

2

Preservation. Defense counsel argued that the imposition of increased restitution
violated due process. R. 127:19-20. This reference to due process, within the context of
counsel's objection, preserved the double jeopardy argument for review. R. 127:19-20.
Regardless of whether this argument preserved the issue for review, this Court can review
the issue under Utah Rule Criminal Procedure 22(e) because a sentence imposed in
violation of double jeopardy is an illegal sentence that must be vacated. See generally
Strickland v. State, 681 So.2d 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (vacating increased
restitution sentence that violated protection against double jeopardy).
Issue III: Whether the trial court violated the right to presence, allocution, and due
process when it increased Rodrigues' sentence by increasing restitution outside
Rodrigues* presence after the trial court entered a final judgment that included a
restitution order, and transferred jurisdiction to the Board of Pardons?
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law. See Holm, 2006 UT
31, TJIO; Harris, 2004 UT 103,1fl[21-24.
Preservation. Defense counsel argued that imposition of an increased restitution
amount after judgment was entered and the case transferred to the Board of Pardons
violated due process. R. 127:19-20. Regardless of whether this argument preserved the
issue, this claim can be reviewed by this Court pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 22(e).

3

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
The texts of the following statutes, rules, and constitutional provision are in
Addendum C:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2007);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(a) (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (Supp. 2007);
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) & (e);
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b);
Utah Const, art. I, §12;
U.S. Const, amend. V & XIV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information filed April 25, 2003, the State of Utah charged Rodrigues with
two counts of criminal non-support, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-7-201 (2003). R. 1-5. On May 19, 2005, Rodrigues pled guilty to one count of
criminal nonsupport, a third degree felony. R. 46-56. The trial court sentenced
Rodrigues to prison and entered judgment on March 19, 2007. R. 80. As part of that
judgment, the trial court ordered Rodrigues "to pay $54,600 restitution through Board of
Pardons.'' R. 80-81. A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A.
On March 29, 2007, ten days after entering judgment, the trial court entered a
sentencing order, reiterating that Rodrigues was sentenced to zero to five years at the

Utah State Prison, and also that "[a] restitution judgment in favor of the State of Utah is
awarded in the amount of $54,600 which represents child support arrears for the
Defendant's children with Jennifer Falsone and Michele Rodrigues through March 19,
2007. Restitution to be paid through the Board of Pardons." R. 84-85. A copy of that
sentencing order is in Addendum A along with the original judgment.
A month later, on April 25, 2007, the state filed a "Motion to Amend Restitution
Judgment and Request for Hearing." R. 89-91. A copy of that motion is in Addendum
D. On August 15, 2007, the trial court held a hearing and granted the state's motion. R.
107. Rodrigues was not transported from the prison for that hearing. R. 107; 127:18.
The trial court entered an "Amended Restitution Order" on August 20, 2007, increasing
the amount of restitution to $65,403.66. R. 110-11. See Addendum B.1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The trial court sentenced Rodrigues on March 19, 2007 to serve zero to five years
at the Utah State Prison and ordered that he "pay $54,600 restitution through Board of
Pardons." R. 80-81. The $54,600 court-ordered restitution was $160 less than the
complete restitution requested by the state. R. 127:4-5, 16. The court entered judgment
on the day of sentencing, and Rodrigues began serving his sentence. R. 80-81.

The trial court record originally contained an entry at R. 114 duplicating the Amended
Restitution Order but also indicating "no objection by Michael Misner, counsel for Deft"
to the increased restitution amount. Appellate counsel for Rodrigues moved to correct
the record and the trial court granted that motion, removing R. 114 and a "yellow stickie"
found at R. 113. R. 151. The record accurately reflects that defense counsel objected to
the increase in restitution following entry of judgment. R. 151.
5

Ten days later, on March 29, 2007, the trial court entered a Sentencing Order
reiterating that Rodrigues was sentenced to serve zero to five years at the Utah State
Prison. R. 85. That Sentencing Order also awarded "[a] restitution judgment in favor of
the State of Utah . . . in the amount of $54,600" and required that u | restitution . . . be
paid through the Board of Pardons." R. 85.
The trial court arrived at the restitution figure based on the state's request at
sentencing. R. 127:3-5. The prosecutor pointed out that although one of the criminal
nonsupport counts had been dismissed, Rodrigues had "agreed to the restitution for both
families." R. 127:3. The trial judge then recited the figures that he thought were due and
the prosecutor corrected those figures, stating that the restitution figure "is actually even
higher." R. 127:4. The state specifically requested restitution in the amount of
$30,680.96 on one case and $24,078.76 on the other case. R. 127:4. The prosecutor said
she could add the two figures, but the court had a calculator and arrived at the total
restitution figure of $54,760. R. 127:4-5. Defense counsel did not object to the
restitution amount and the trial court subsequently ordered that Rodrigues pay $54,600 in
court-ordered restitution. R. 127:16; 80-81.
The amount requested by the state was significantly higher than the amount in the
presentence report (PSR). The PSR, prepared in March 2007, indicates that Rodrigues
failed to pay support to Jennifer Falsone in the amount of $17,051 for the period of May
1. 1999 through March 31, 2004, and $19,352 for support to Michclc Rodrigues during
that same period. R. 79:3. At sentencing, the trial court reviewed the PSR and
apparently wrote notations regarding the amount of restitution in the margins. R. 79:3.
6

The plea agreement shows a different figure than the PSR. It indicates that
Rodrigues agreed to pay restitution on both counts "from May 1, 1999 through the date of
sentencing." R. 53. According to the plea agreement, the total amount of restitution
accrued as of the date of the plea hearing on May 19, 2005 was $49,000.49. R. 53. The
plea agreement further indicates that Rodrigues had a continuing obligation to pay an
additional $617 per month. R. 54. The plea agreement also incorporates a uDebt
Computation" and indicates thatfcC|a]nupdated calculation will be provided the day of
sentencing." R. 53-54. The Debt Computation shows that through May, 2005, Rodrigues
owed $22,995.73 in restitution to Jennifer Falsone and $26,004.76 to Michele Rodrigues,
for a total of $49,000.49. R. 37-45. The plea agreement also states that the "FIRST
MONTHLY PAYMENT WILL BE DUE BY JULY 30, 2005." R. 54 (capitalization in
original).
At sentencing on March 19, 2007, the state represented to the trial court that the
exact amount of restitution was $54,760. R. 127:4-5. The court accepted the state's
representation as to the exact amount of restitution and entered judgment and
commitment followed by a sentencing order indicating a civil judgment had been entered
in the amount of $54,600. R. 80-85.
After the criminal and civil judgments were entered and Rodrigues began serving
his sentence, the state filed its motion to increase the restitution amount. R. 89-92.
According to that motion, the state had miscalculated the amount of child support arrears
owed to Michele Rodrigues. R. 90-91. The state told the court it should have requested
$34,722.70 instead of the $24,078.76 it requested as the amount owed to Michele
7

Rodrigues, and that the total amount of restitution was $65,403.66. R. 90. It attached an
updated Debt Computation, showing the amount of $34,722.70 owed Michele Rodrigues,
to its motion. R. 100-04.
The trial court held a hearing on the state's motion on August 15, 2007. R. 107.
Rodrigues was not present at the hearing because the trial court did not transport him
from the Utah State Prison where he was serving his sentence. R. 107; 127:18. The state
argued that the trial court had jurisdiction to amend the restitution order pursuant to Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b). R. 127:19. Over defense counsel's objection and in
the absence of Rodrigues, the trial court increased restitution to $65,403.66. R. 110-11.
The court entered an Amended Restitution Order, which included an amendment to the
restitution judgment, on August 20, 2007. R. 110-11.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not have jurisdiction to increase the restitution amount after
entering a final restitution order as part of the judgment and commitment. As the trial
court recognized at sentencing, jurisdiction transferred to the Board of Pardons when
judgment was entered and the trial court did not retain jurisdiction to increase the
restitution order.
Although the state argued that Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) allowed the
trial court to amend the restitution order after the state decided that it had requested an
incorrect restitution amount, that rule did not give the court jurisdiction because Rule
30(b) "Ms limited to curing errors in accurately memorializing a judgment." State v.
Moya, 815 P.2d 1312, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in original). Since the
8

judgment in this case accurately memorialized the trial court's sentencing decision, Rule
30 (b) was not applicable.
The record also demonstrates that Rule 30(b) was not applicable since the state
had to present additional evidence and the court had to make a judicial decision in order
to increase restitution. Because the change required judicial decision making to, among
other things, determine what the correct increased amount should be, this matter could
not properly be addressed pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b).
Nor did the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2007) give
the trial court jurisdiction to increase the restitution amount. Although a provision of that
statute allows a trial court to enter a restitution order up to a year after judgment in some
circumstances, that provision applies only if a final restitution order is not included in the
judgment. In this case where the defendant did not request a restitution hearing and the
trial court entered a final order of restitution that reflected the amount requested by the
state and included that order in the judgment, jurisdiction transferred to the Board of
Pardons. The trial court therefore did not have jurisdiction to enter the Amended
Restitution Order, requiring that it be vacated.
The amended order increasing restitution also violated the state and federal
protections against double jeopardy. Because the trial court entered a final order of
restitution as part of the judgment, it lost the ability to later consider the state's request
that restitution be increased. As other states have recognized, increasing restitution after
entry of a final sentencing order that includes a final restitution order violates double
jeopardy.
9

The trial court also violated Rodrigues' rights to presence and allocution when it
proceeded in his absence. Because Rodrigues was absent from the hearing since the
court did not transport him from the prison, the state cannot establish a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the right to presence. And since the state introduced additional
evidence and the judge engaged injudicial decision making, Rodrigues had the right to
be present. In fact, had he been present, Rodrigues might have presented information
which would have convinced the court that increasing restitution was not warranted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
INCREASE THE RESTITUTION AMOUNT AFTER ENTERING JUDGMENT
AND TRANSFERRING JURISDICTION TO THE BOARD OF PARDONS
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to increase the restitution amount after it entered
judgment and Rodrigues began serving his sentence. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
30(b), which allows only the correction of mechanical errors made in memorializing a
judgment, did not create trial court jurisdiction because the increase in restitution
required additional evidence and judicial decision making. The restitution statute, Utah
Code Ann. §77-38a-302 (Supp. 2007), also did not create jurisdiction for the trial court
since that statute authorizes a court to impose restitution following judgment only in
those circumstances where restitution has not previously been imposed. Because the trial
court entered a final judgment that included a final restitution order, it did not have
jurisdiction to subsequently increase the restitution amount.

10

This issue is properly before the court since Rodrigues objected below. Even if he
had not objected, this Court can review this error pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure and also because a question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time.
A. The Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Increase the Restitution Amount after
Entering a Final Judgment that Included a Restitution Order
Final judgment is entered in a criminal case when the trial court imposes sentence,
and signs and enters the judgment. State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ^4, 57 P.3d 1065;
State v. Todd, 2004 UT App 266, If 10 n.l, 98 P.3d 46, rev'don other grounds, 128 P.3d
1199. When a trial judge imposes sentence and final judgment is entered, the trial court
ordinarily loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State v. McGuire, 2005 UT
App 13, 2005 WL 67585, at *1 (unpublished); State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). Jurisdiction is transferred to the Board of Pardons when a defendant is
sentenced to prison. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (Supp. 2007); State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d
207, 209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Although the trial court ordinarily loses jurisdiction over a criminal case when
judgment is entered, there are exceptions that allow a trial court to take further action in a
case. In this case, the state argued that Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) allowed
the court to change the amount of restitution ordered in the judgment. R. 127:19. The
state's reliance on Utah Rule Criminal Procedure 30(b) was misplaced, however, because
Rule 30(b) is limited to the correction of a mechanical error in memorializing a judgment
and does not allow a trial court to reopen the proceedings so as to allow the introduction

11

of additional evidence or the exercise of further judicial decision making. See Utah R.
Crim. P. 30(b); Moya, 815 P.2d at 1317.
Rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and its civil counterpart, Rule 60(a),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allow for the correction of inaccuracies in memorializing
judgments. See Moya, 815 P.2d at 1314 n.3. Although the language of the two rules is
"nearly tcxtually identical," Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) is "the more
appropriate vehicle" in a criminal case. Id.; Utah R, Crim. P. 30(b). Rule 30(b) states,
"[cjlerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and
after such notice, if any, as the court may order." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b).
The distinction between clerical errors, which can be corrected under Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 30(b) or Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), and judicial errors,
which cannot be changed under either rule, does not depend on "who made the error, but
whether the error was made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment." 46
Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §142 (2008)(citations omitted). The rule allows correction only
when an error is made in recording a judgment; in other words, Rule 30(b) "is limited to
curing errors in accurately memorializing a judgment." Moya, 815 P.2d at 1317
(emphasis in original); InreC.S.B., 2000 UT App 362, \9, 17 P.3d 1131. A clerical error
subject to correction under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) or Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(a) is an error made in the execution or recordation of a judgment whereas
errors that cannot be changed under these rules are errors made by the judge in exercising
discretion and rendering judgment. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §142; United States v.
12

Burd, 86 F.3d 285, 288 (2d Cir. 1996) (recognizing that the rule authorizes a trial court to
correct only clerical errors in recording a judgment).
This Court articulated the distinction between clerical errors that can be corrected
under Rule 60(a) and judicial errors which cannot be corrected under the rule in JoUey v.
Jolley, 2004 UT App 416, 2004 WL 2569423 (per curiam) (unpublished).
Rule 60(a) applies only to cure errors ;in accurately memorializing a judgment."
In re C.S.B., 2000 UT App 362, ]} 9, 17 P.3d 1131. Clerical error uis a type of
mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record and
which does not involve a legal decision or judgment." Stanger v. Sentinel Sec.
Life Ins. Co , 669 P.2d 1201. 1206 (Utah 1983^ A clerical error is one of
recording "that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the
actual intention of the court." Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 770
P.2d 125,130 (Utah 1989). In contrast, a judicial error wCis one made in rendering
the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect judgment." Id.
Jolley, 2004 WL 2569423, at * 1.
The Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988),
illustrates the circumstances under which Rule 30(b) can be used to correct a clerical
error. In Lorrah, the trial judge orally sentenced the defendant to serve a minimum
mandatory term often years to life at the Utah State Prison. Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389. A
substitute clerk incorrectly filled out the judgment to reflect a lighter sentence. Id. The
judge's regular clerk ultimately prepared an amended judgment that reflected the
sentence the judge had orally imposed at sentencing, Id. The Supreme Court held that
the amended judgment "reflected but a correction of a clerical mistake" and upheld the
amended judgment even though the change had been done without a hearing or the
presence of the defendant. Id. at 1390.
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In addition to illustrating the application of Rule 30(b), Lorrah also clarifies that a
correction made under that rule does not require a hearing or the presence of the
defendant. Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1390. This is so because the judge made his decision at
the previous hearing; due process and the right to presence were served because the
defendant was present and had the opportunity to present relevant information before the
court reached its decision. Id Due process and the right to presence therefore were not
violated in Lorrah when the clerical error in the judgment was corrected to reflect the
actual decision of the judge. IcL
Unlike Lorrah, the judge's decision in this case to impose $65,403.66 in restitution
was not made at the sentencing hearing. In fact, the judge ordered, based on the
representations of the state, that Rodrigues be required to pay $54,600 in restitution. R.
127:4-5, 16. The clerk subsequently entered judgment which correctly memorialized that
order. R. 80-81, 84-85. Because the judgment memorialized the actual order of the
court, the judgment did not involve an error in recording the judgment. Rather than
involving an error recording the judgment, the error in this case was one that involved
rendering the judgment and could not be corrected as a clerical mistake under Rule 30(b).
Sec Moya, 815 P.2d at 1317 (stating that Rule 30(b) "is limited to curing errors in
accurately memorializing a judgment").
The fact that the error could not be corrected from a review of the record prior to
judgment further demonstrates that the trial court could not use Rule 30(b) as a vehicle
for amending the judgment. See Jolley, 2004 UT App 416 (quoting Stanger v. Sentinel
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983)) (stating that a "[cjlerical error cis a
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type of mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record and
which does not involve a legal decision or judgment/") Since the state needed to submit
further evidence to the court as part of the motion to amend judgment in order to establish
the increased restitution amount, the error was not mechanical in nature or an error
memorializing the judgment. See R. 89-104. The error therefore could not be corrected
under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b).
The nature of the error also shows that the error was not a mechanical error that
could be easily corrected by a review of the record, and instead required judicial decision
making. Aside from the fact that the additional amount sought by the state was not
included in the record prior to judgment, the figures that are contained in the record raise
a question as to what constitutes the actual figure for ''complete restitution" and required
judicial decision making in order to designate a "court-ordered" restitution amount. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-3 02(5). For example, the state agreed as part of the plea
bargain that on May 19, 2005, Rodrigues owed $49,000.49 in complete restitution. R.
53. The plea agreement also shows that Rodrigues had a continuing obligation to pay
$617 per month, and agreed to pay restitution "through the date of sentencing." R. 53-54.
Even if this obligated Rodrigues to pay restitution until he was actually sentenced twentytwo months later, the judge was required to review the figures in conjunction with the
plea agreement and determine an accurate amount of complete restitution; this could not
be done pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) which allows only the
correction of an error in memorializing a judgment.
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Moreover, the judge was required to determine whether the $65,403,66 sought by
the state was based on an accurate assessment of required monthly payments and interest
for the period between the plea and sentencing and also whether to require Rodrigues to
pay interest for the twenty-two months following the plea. This required judicial decision
making and the rendering of a decision, which cannot be done under Rule 30(b).
The distinction in section 77-38a-302 between "complete" and "court-ordered"
restitution further demonstrates the complexity of the restitution decision and that the
error in this case required judicial decision making rather than the mechanical correction
of a clerical error. Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-302 makes a distinction between "complete
restitution," which is "restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused
by the defendant," and "court-ordered restitution," which is the amount the court actually
orders the defendant to pay. Id. Pursuant to this statute, even if the actual amount of
complete restitution were $65,403.66, the trial court nevertheless was required to
determine whether to order that Rodrigues pay that full amount as court-ordered
restitution. In his initial judgment, the judge did not order the full amount; instead, he
ordered that Rodrigues pay $160 less than the amount requested by the state. R. 127:4-5,
16. The state did not object to this order. R. 127:16-17. Although Rodrigues agreed to
pay restitution through the date of sentencing, section 77-38a-302 required the trial judge
to assess whether the complete restitution was also the court-ordered restitution. This
additional element of judicial decision making further demonstrates that the decision to
increase the amount of restitution required the rendering of a decision and not the
correction of a clerical error.
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Additionally, the passage of time between the plea and sentencing demonstrates
that the court was required to render a decision rather than make a mechanical correction
of an error. In fact, the plea agreement shows that the parties did not anticipate that
twenty-two months would pass before sentencing, and did not include details as to what
would occur if sentencing were delayed. When Rodrigues agreed to pay restitution for
ongoing support through the date of sentencing, the parties anticipated that sentencing
would occur on July 11, 2005, about two months after the plea, and that Rodrigues would
be placed on probation. R. 53-54, 66. They also agreed that Rodrigues' "TIRST
MONTHLY PAYMENT WILL BE DUE ON JULY 30, 2005." R. 54 (capitalization in
original). Although sentencing did not occur on July 11, 2005 because Rodrigues did not
appear (see R. 66), the judge nevertheless had to decide whether to require Rodrigues to
pay restitution for an additional twenty-two months, including time that Mr. Rodrigues
spent in jail. See Utah Code Ann. §76-7-20 l(5)(a)(2003) (stating "it is an affirmative
defense that the accused is unable to provide support"). Deciding whether to require
Rodrigues to pay restitution for all twenty-two months following the plea hearing was an
act of judicial decision making, and the judge did not have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
30(b) to make that decision and increase the amount of restitution.
Although the increase in restitution required judicial decision making, the trial
court approached the issue as if it were cognizable under Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 30(b). Like Lorrah, the court proceeded even though Rodrigues was not
transported from the prison to the hearing. R. 127:18. Unlike Lorrah, however, holding
the hearing in the absence of Rodrigues was not permissible and violated his right to
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presence and due process along with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) since the
judge was considering evidence and making a decision to render a judgment imposing a
harsher sentence. Sec State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^[25, 79 P.3d 937 (holding that
Rule 22(a) and the common law right to allocution require that a defendant be present at
sentencing and afforded the right to make a statement). Due process required that the
judge render his decision based on relevant and reliable information only after affording
Rodrigues the right to presence and allocution. Id; see also State v. Thorkclson, 2004
UT App 9,1[11, 84 P.3d 854 (citing State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985));
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Had Rodrigues been present, he might have been able to
contribute information that would have convinced the judge not to increase the
restitution. Because the judge was rendering a decision, Rule 30(b) did not authorize the
procedure and the trial court erred in increasing restitution.
Nor does the language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2007) create
jurisdiction for a trial court to reopen the judgment and reconsider restitution under these
circumstances. Although that statute, as recently amended, allows a trial court to make
restitution orders within one year of judgment when such orders are not imposed at
sentencing, it does not create jurisdiction for a trial court to reopen a final judgment
which includes an order imposing restitution. See Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-302(5)
(d)(ii). Pursuant to its plain language, section 77-38a~302 allows a trial court to impose
restitution up to one year after sentencing only //the court was unable to make a
restitution order at the time of sentencing. Utah Code Ann. §77~38a-302(2) (b), 5(d)(i).
Subsection (5)(d)(i) states in relevant part: ''Except as provided in 5(d)(ii), the court shall
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determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution
orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(d)(i) (emphasis added). This provision allowing
imposition within a year of sentencing does not apply in circumstances such as these
where the trial court imposed a restitution order and entered final judgment.
The trial court lost jurisdiction to increase the amount of restitution when it
entered final judgment which included a final order of restitution. The court did not
retain jurisdiction over the restitution issue and instead issued a subsequent order
reiterating the restitution amount and ordering that it be converted to a civil judgment.
Jurisdiction transferred to the Board of Pardons, as the trial court recognized when it
concluded the sentencing hearing, stating:
I'll order that you pay the sum of $54,600 in restitution. The Board of Pardons
will make an effort to collect it, you know, that may be something that's just not
going to happen given your history, but they" make that effort. . . . [0]nce I've
sentenced you to prison the case becomes theirs to decide what happens thereafter,
but the decision to send you to prison is mine and that's what fm going to do.
And I'll just order that you pay restitution.
R. 127:16-17.
The trial court was correct at sentencing when it recognized that jurisdiction over
the case transferred to the Board of Pardons. Accordingly, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to subsequently enter an order increasing restitution, and the Amended
Restitution Order should be vacated.

19

B. This Issue is Properly Before the Court
This Court can review this issue since counsel for Roclrigucs objected to the trial
court's lack of jurisdiction. R. 127:19-20. Even if counsel had not objected, however,
this Court could review the issue pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) and
also because a claim that a court lacked jurisdiction can be raised at any time. See
Decker, 2008 UT App 70, ^[8 (citing State v. Sun Sur. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74, ff9 99 P.3d
818).
Defense counsel preserved this issue by arguing that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to increase the restitution amount. R. 127:19-20. In fact, the state was aware
of defense counsel's objection and addressed the jurisdictional concern before defense
counsel made the objection, by arguing that the court had jurisdiction under Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 30(b) to correct the error the state made in computing restitution.
The prosecutor stated in part:
Prosecutor: But from our [perspective] it's simply an error of- whether you want
- it's an error on my part. Whether - 1 don't know that I'd call it clerical because I
didn't - it was just picking up the wrong piece of paper from the table in court
basically, and I think that the Court would be able to do it under Rule 30 for
correcting general errors and things like that on the docket.
The Court: Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure?
Prosecutor: Criminal Procedure, uh-huh (affirmative).
R. 127:19. Defense counsel was then given an opportunity to state his objection.
Defense counsel: Judge, our argument would be simply that the Court no longer
has jurisdiction over the case. This isnT a case where restitution was held open.
A specific figure was asked for; a specific figure was granted. As far as the errors
that we're talking about now, if the Court has made an error in what the court had
put as the figure misreading the pre-sentence report or mis-stating numbers that we
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had stated to the court, I think the court could correct its error or its clerical errors.
This isn't that type of error. That's - there's two parties and if the court can
correct the errors of one of the two parties in a case, I think we're running into
some serious problems. So our two positions would be (1) the Court doesn't have
jurisdiction to try to go back and change these things[.] I think it is a violation of
due process. I think the client had his day in court and we decided these matters.
R. 127:19-20. This discussion preserved Rodrigues claim that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to increase restitution following entry of judgment.
Even if defense counsel had not objected, this Court could reach the issue under
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e). That rule states, "[Ijhc court may correct an
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim.
P. 22(e). Illegal sentences reviewable under Rule 22(e) include sentences imposed by a
court that does not have jurisdiction. State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51,1J5, 48 P.3d 228.
Since restitution is part of a criminal sentence, see Utah Code Ann. §76-3-20 l(4)(Supp.
2007); State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the trial court
imposed an illegal sentence because it lacked jurisdiction. This issue can therefore be
reviewed pursuant to Rule 22(e).
Moreover, "c[q]uestions of subject matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised at any
time and are addressed before resolving other claims.'" Decker, 2008 UT App 70, ^f8
(alterations in original) (quoting Sun Sur. Ins. Co., 2004 UT App 74, *\\7). Because
questions of jurisdiction can be raised at any time, this Court reviewed the jurisdictional
claim raised in Decker even though it was raised for the first time on appeal. Id.
Accordingly, this Court can review this issue because it was preserved, and even if
it had not been preserved, the question of jurisdiction is reviewable under Rule 22(e) and
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also because a claim that a court lacked subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any
time. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to increase restitution after imposing
restitution at sentencing and entering final judgment, this Court should order that the
amended restitution order be vacated and the original judgment remain in effect.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURTS VIOLATION OF THE PROTECTION
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY BY INCREASING RODRIGUES'
SENTENCE WHEN IT INCREASED RESTITUTION ALSO REQUIRES THAT
TIIli ORDER INCREASING RESTITUTION BE STRICKEN.
After a trial court enters final judgment and a defendant begins serving his
sentence, any increase in sentence violates the state and federal protections against
double jeopardy. Since restitution is a part of sentence and a final restitution order was
entered at sentencing and included in the final judgment, the increased restitution order
issued in this case resulted in multiple punishments for the same offense, in violation of
the state and federal protections against double jeopardy. Defense counsel's objection
preserved this issue for review, but even if it did not, this Court can review the issue
under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e),
A. The Trial Court's Order Increasing Restitution After Judgment Had
Been Entered and Rodrigucs Began Serving I lis Sentence Violated the
Stale and Federal Protections Against Double Jeopardy
The protection against double jeopardy, found in article 1, § 12 of the Utah
Constitution, the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution, applicable to the slates
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and Utah Code Ann. §77-16(2)(a) (2003), protects individuals from multiple punishments for the same offense.
U.S. Const, amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
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put in jeopardy of life or limb"); Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (vCnor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(a) ("No person shall
be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense).

w6

If there is anything settled in the

jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished
for the same offense. And . . . there has never been any doubt of [this rule's] entire and
complete protection of the party when a second punishment is proposed in the same
court, on the same facts, for the same statutory offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711 717-18 (1969) (alterations in original), overruled on other grounds Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)) (omissions and alterations in original). a[TJhe Constitution
was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same
offense as from being twice tried for it." Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173 (1873).
Utah's state constitutional protection against double jeopardy is ''different from
and provide[s] greater protection than those afforded by the United States Constitution
. . . ." Harris, 2004 UT 103, ^[23. Because the Utah state constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is stronger than its federal counterpart, the Utah Supreme Court
has chosen to address a double jeopardy claim within the context of article 1, section 12
of the state constitution. See id. In any event, both the state constitution, with its
powerful protection against double jeopardy, and the double jeopardy protection of the
federal constitution, along with state statutory provisions, preclude increasing restitution
after a trial court has entered judgment which includes an order of restitution, and the
defendant has begun serving the sentence. See generally Strickland, 681 So.2d 929
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(holding that double jeopardy is violated when a court imposes increased restitution after
imposing a lawful sentence)
Double jeopardy is violated when a trial court increases a sentence after a
defendant has commenced to serve it. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 176; United States v.
DiFranccsco, 449 U.S. 117, 134 (1980) (citing inter alia Vincent v. United States, 337
l\2d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 380 U.S. 988 (1965)); Borum v. United States,
409 F.2d 433, 440-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). A subsequent sentence is more severe if il
"exceedfs] the first in appearance or effect, in the number of its elements, or in their
magnitude." State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981) (internal citation
omitted). Any "actual increase in permitted restitution would be an increase in
punishment/5 State v. Dominauez, 1999 UT App 343, ^12, 992 P.2d 995, in violation of
the protection against double jeopardy. £5ee also Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(4)
(establishing that restitution is a part of sentence).
A sentence may be increased without violating double jeopardy when the initial
sentence was illegal. See Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91
L.lid. 818 (1947) (recognizing that an illegal sentence can be corrected without violating
double jeopardy); State v. Babbef 813 P.2d 86, 88-89 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that
because an illegal sentence has no legal effect, correcting it to include an increased
sentence does not violate the protection against double jeopardy). Thus, if the trial court
had imposed an illegal sentence, later imposing restitution might not violate double
jeopardy Sec Lopez-Sanchez v State, 879 A.2d 695, 715 (Md. 2005) (Wilner, J., and
llarrcll, J., concurring)(citing DiFranccsco, 449 U.S. 117) (uIn a criminal case, a
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restitution order, unless entered as a condition of probation, is entered as a judgment that
becomes part of a criminal sentence. Although Federal double jeopardy principles do not
absolutely preclude a criminal sentence from being increased when authorized by statute,
once such a sentence is entered, it is ordinarily final"); see also Utah Code Ann. § 7738a-302(5)(d)(i) (indicating that a trial court "shall make all restitution orders at the time
of sentencing if feasible" and allowing court to impose restitution after sentencing only if
it was not imposed at the time of sentencing).
But when a court enters a final restitution order as part of a legal sentence, as was
the case here, it cannot later amend its order to increase restitution. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-38a-302 (5)(d); see also Strickland, 681 So.2d 929 (indicating that increasing
restitution after imposing a lawful sentence violates double jeopardy); Wilson v. State,
688 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the court lacked authority to
amend a final restitution order after final judgment was entered). This is because any
"actual increase in permitted restitution would be an increase in punishment[.]"
Dominouez, 1999 UT App 343,1112; see also Strickland, 681 So.2d 929; Wilson v. State,
688N.E.2d 1293.
Once a legal sentence has been imposed and a defendant has begun to serve that
sentence, increasing the amount of ordered restitution violates double jeopardy. People
v. Shepherd, 989 P.2d 183, 187 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that after a legal sentence
is imposed and defendant has begun serving that sentence, increasing restitution increases
the sentence, in violation of the protection against double jeopardy); see also People v.
Harman, 97 P.3d 290 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (indicating that wConce a legal sentence has
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been imposed and a defendant has begun serving it, an increase in the amount of
restitution ordered also violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy"
unless the court, acting pursuant to the relevant statute, retained jurisdiction to impose
restitution after entering judgment); Harris v. State, 413 S.E. 2d 439, 441 (Ga. 1992)
(holding that a court cannot increase restitution after a defendant begins serving his
sentence without violating protection against double jeopardy); Strickland, 681 So.2d 929
(holding that double jeopardy is violated when restitution is increased after a final
sentencing order that includes restitution is entered); State in Interest of Albert Z., 517
A.2d 710 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1986) (same). It is only when the court has not yet determined
the amount of restitution and the relevant statute allows imposition of restitution
following sentencing, that an amended order of restitution can be imposed without
violating double jeopardy. See Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-302(5) (d)(i); People v.
McCann, 122 P.3d 1085, 1087-88 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
At the time of sentencing, the court and all parties believed that the restitution
amount was final. Because restitution was considered and ordered, as required by Utah's
restitution statute, the court's restitution order was a final sentence. The fact that the state
submitted a request for an amount that it later deemed to be incorrect does not change the
finality of the judgment. See Strickland, 681 So.2dat930. As the court pointed out of in
Strickland, the protection against double jeopardy precluded the trial court from altering
the judgment based on the state's error in computing restitution where the court had
previously imposed a final judgment that included a final restitution order. Id.
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The state argues that dental bills are properly a part of medical expenses and, since
Strickland agreed to pay restitution, the imposition of additional medical expenses
did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because it
was not a sentence enhancement. We disagree. At the first sentencing hearing the
state asked that restitution be made for the victim's medical bills in the specific
amount of $835. No indication was given by the state that there were any further
expenses. No request was made for the court to retain jurisdiction to determine at
a later time the amount of restitution Strickland would be obligated to make. It is
clear from the record that everyone took the $835 figure as the final amount.
Thus, once the sentencing hearing was over, Strickland's sentence was final and
the state lost its ability to request restitution for additional items.
Id,
As previously outlined in Point I, the trial court entered a final judgment when it
imposed restitution, sentenced Rodrigues and entered a judgment of conviction which
included the final order of restitution. Because Rodrigues did not ccobject[ J to the
imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution," the trial court did not set the matter
for hearing and the order imposing judgment was a final sentencing order. See Utah
Code Ann. §77-38a-302(4) (Supp. 2007). Moreover, since the judge determined
restitution at the time of sentencing, the provision of Utah Code Ann. §77-3 8a302(5)(d)(i), which allows a court to determine restitution within a year of sentencing in
circumstances where making that determination at the time of sentencing is not feasible,
did not apply. Because the trial court considered and ordered restitution as required by
Utah's statutes, the restitution order became final when judgment was entered and
Rodrigues began serving his sentence. As was the case in Strickland, the protection
against double jeopardy precluded the trial court from increasing the restitution order
following sentencing. The trial court's increase in restitution following entry of final
judgment and commencement of sentence violated state and federal constitutional
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protections, as well as Utah's statutory protection, against double jeopardy. The
amended restitution order must therefore be stricken.
B, This Court Can Review Rodrigues' Double Jeopardy Claim.
Although defense counsel stated that the increase in restitution violated due
process, he did not explicitly use the words "double jeopardy." R. 127:19-20. Since the
federal protection against double jeopardy applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, the due process objection should have alerted the trial
court, especially in the context of defense counsel's argument, that the order increasing
restitution violated double jeopardy. R. 127:19-20. Defense counsel stated:
Defense Counsel: Judge, our argument would be simply that the Court no
longer has jurisdiction over the case. This isn't a case where restitution was
held open. A specific figure was asked for; a specific figure was granted.
As far as errors that we're talking about now, if the Court had made an
error in what the court had put as the figure misreading the pre-sentence
report or mis-stating numbers that we had stated to the court, I think the
court could correct its error or its clerical errors. This isn't that type of an
error. Thai's - - there's two parties and if the court can correct the errors of
one of the two parties in a case, I think we're running into some serious
problems. So our two positions would be (1) the Court doesn't have
jurisdiction to try to go back and change these lhings[.] I think is a
violation of due process. I think the client had his day in court and we
decided these mailers.
R. 127:19-20. This adequately informed the court that imposing a new sentence violated
double jeopardy.
But even if defense counsel's objection did not preserve the double jeopardy
argument, this Court can reach the issue under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e).
Thai rule stales, u[l]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Illegal sentences reviewable under
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Rule 22(e) include sentences imposed by a court that does not have jurisdiction. Telford,
2002 UT51, f5; Decker, 2008 UT App 70, ^8 (quoting Sun Stir. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74,
%/) (holding that a claim that a court lacked jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on
appeal). A claim that imposition of a second sentence violates double jeopardy is similar
to a claim that a court lacked jurisdiction in that it challenges the court's authority to
impose the order. Moreover, a sentence that violates double jeopardy is unlawful and
must be vacated. See generally Strickland, 681 So.2d at 930 (ordering that increased
restitution order entered in violation of double jeopardy be vacated). A sentence that
violates the protection against double jeopardy is therefore an illegal sentence and a claim
that a sentence violates double jeopardy can be raised pursuant to Rule 22(e).
Hence, even if defense counsel did not preserve this issue for review, this court is
able to review the double jeopardy claim. In fact, a sentence imposed in violation of
double jeopardy is not only an illegal sentence, but it is also a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner since a court without authority to do so imposed a sentence in violation of
constitutional protections. The double jeopardy violation in increasing Rodrigues'
sentence after entry of final judgment and transfer of jurisdiction to the Board of Pardons
requires that the increased restitution order be vacated.
POINT III. IMPOSING AN INCREASED RESTITUTION AMOUNT IN
RODRIGUES' ABSENCE VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO PRESENCE,
ALLOCUTION AND DUE PROCESS
Although the trial court's lack of jurisdiction and violation of the protection
against double jeopardy should require vacation of the amended restitution order, the
violation of the rights to presence, allocution, and due process also requires that the
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increased restitution order be vacated. These significant constitutional and statutory
violations can be reached because they were preserved below, or alternatively, pursuant
to rule 22(e).
A. The Violation of Rodrigucs* Right to Presence, Allocution and Due Process
Requires that the Restitution Order be Vacated
Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees the right to presence in a
criminal case. It states, u\ i |n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . ." Utah Const, art. I, §12. The right to
presence is also codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(a) (2003).
"| Defendants have the right to be present at all stages of the criminal proceedings
against them . . . ." Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^{12. The Utah Supreme Court recognized
the state constitutional right to presence extends to sentencing in State v. Anderson, 929
P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah 1996). See also State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986)
(recognizing state constitutional right to presence in trial context). Following Anderson,
this Court and the Utah Supreme Court applied the right to presence at sentencing in
Wanosik, 2003 UT 46; State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615; and other
cases. Although all of Utah's case law discussing the right to presence does not
specifically mention the state constitutional provision, its genesis is Anderson which
explicitly relics on article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. See Anderson, 929 P.2d
at 1109-10 (citing article 1, section 12 as the basis for the right to presence); Wanosik,
2003 UT 46, <[[12 (relying on Anderson in recognizing a right to presence at sentencing).
These cases establish thai a defendant has a state right to presence and allocution at
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sentencing. Since sentencing includes the imposition of restitution, see Dominguez, 1999
UT App 343,1J12; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4), the rights to presence and allocution
extend to any hearing where a court determines restitution. See Utah Code Ann. §77-16( 1 )(a); Wanosik, 2003 UT 46,1fl[12-19.
Federal due process also guarantees the right to presence. See State v. Hubbard,
2002 UT 45,1f33 n. 7, 48 P.3d 853. That right c is rooted in the Confrontation Clause,
[and] further protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant
is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence."" Id. (citing United States v. Gagnon,
470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985)); see also State v. Burt 839 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). Under the federal protection, a defendant has a due process right to be present
c

" whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial to the fullness of his

opportunity to defend against the charge . . . . [The] presence of a defendant is a
condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by
his absence, and to that extent only.'" Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ^33 n.7 (quoting Gagnon,
470 U.S. at 526 (citation omitted))(omissions and alterations in original).
The right to presence applies in this case where the state presented evidence in
support of its request that the judge increase restitution at the post-judgment hearing.
Rodrigues' presence would not only have furthered justice and fairness by allowing
Rodrigues to see and hear the reasons for the increase, but also would have allowed
Rodrigues to give the trial court input about the amount of time he had spent in jail and
any reasons for failing to appear for sentencing when it was originally scheduled, which
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may have impacted on the judge's decision as to whether to award complete restitution as
court-ordered restitution.
Although a defendant has the right to presence at sentencing, that right can be
waived. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46,^12-13 (citing Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678). Any waiver of
the right to presence must be knowing and voluntary. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, *|[15. The
burden of proof is on the prosecution. Id. In this case, the state cannot sustain the burden
of establishing a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence. Rodrigues was
in prison and the trial court simply failed to transport him to the proceedings. R. 107;
127:18. Because Rodrigues did not waive his right to presence, that right was violated
when the trial court conducted hearing at which it accepted the state's representations
regarding the amount of restitution due and increased the restitution award.
Moreover, by depriving Rodrigues of his right to presence, the trial court also
deprived him of his right to allocution. See Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, *[]19. Article 1,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution requires that sentencing be based on reliable and
relevant information. Id, Allocution by a defendant, along with arguments by counsel,
serve to fulfill this due process requirement as well as the requirements of Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 22(a). Id By conducting the hearing in the absence of Rodrigues,
who was being held at the prison, the trial court deprived Rodrigues of his right to
presence and allocution, and also denied him due process by failing to give him the
opportunity to speak and present reliable and relevant information. Had Rodrigues been
present, he may have had an explanation as to why he had not appeared at sentencing or
may have been able to provide information about his inability to pay restitution. At the
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very least, he could have informed the court that he had been jailed for a portion of the
twenty-two months or presented other information that might have convinced the court
that the increase in restitution was not warranted.
Because the trial court violated Rodrigues' right to allocution and presence, the
Amended Sentencing Order should be vacated.
B. This Court Can Review This Issue on Appeal.
Defense counsel argued that the hearing violated due process. R. 127:19-20.
Although the context of this argument suggests at the very least that the action violated
the protection against double jeopardy, it also should have alerted the trial court that
Rodrigues' right to a full and fair hearing in his presence was being violated. Regardless
of whether this objection preserved the issue for review, this claim nevertheless can be
reviewed pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e).
A sentence imposed in violation of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a), due
process or the right to presence and allocution is an illegal sentence that can be reviewed
under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e). State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79,1|13, 99
P.3d 358. This means that a violation of due process or Rule 22(a) error in imposing
restitution can be reviewed pursuant to Rule 22(e). Id. at ^[5, 13. In fact, a sentence that
is imposed outside the presence of the defendant and without the opportunity for
allocution is a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). In this
case where the trial court conducted a hearing, accepted evidence and rendered a
decision, the sentence was imposed in violation of Mr. Rodrigues' state constitutional
right to presence and due process, and must be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant/Defendant Ronald Richard Rodrigues respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the Amended Restitution Order.
SUBMITTHD this 5 ^ day of May, 2008.
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
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vs.

Case No: 031902822 FS

RONALD RICHARD RODRIGUES,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

ROBIN W. REESE
March 19, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
marlened
Prosecutor: ROZYCKI, ANN C
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MISNER, MICHAEL D
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 23, 1970
Video
Tape Number:
TAPE
Tape Count: 11:33
CHARGES
1. CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/19/2005 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

P^rr^ 1

Case No: 031902822
Date:
Mar 19, 2007

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
COURT ORDERED DEFT TO PAY $54,600.00 RESTITUTION THROUGH BOARD OF
PARDONS
Q

Dated
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h
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D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judg^***®**^
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ANN ROZYCKI #7609
Assistant Attorney General
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
160 East 300 South
P.O.Box 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
Telephone: (801)366-0199
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SENTENCING ORDER

v.

Criminal No. 031902822FS

RONALD RICHARD RODRIGUES

Judge: ROBIN W. REESE

Defendant.

This matter came on for sentencing before the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge
presiding, on March 19, 2007. The State of Utah was present and represented by Ann Rozycki,
Assistant Attorney General and the Defendant was present and represented by Michael D.
Misner of Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association. The Defendant previously pled guilty to
Count I of the Information, Criminal Non-Support, a Third Degree Felony, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated Section 76-7-201 (1953, as amended) on May 19, 2005. The State agreed

i

to dismiss Count II of the Infonnation. Based upon the Defendant's pica of guilty and good
cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. The Defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 - 5 years in the Utah State
Prison, commitment to begin forthwith.
2. A restitution judgment in favor of the State of Utah is awarded in the amount of
$54,600.00 which represents child support arrears for the Defendant's children with Jennifer
Falsone and Michele Rodriguez through March 19, 2007. Restitution to be paid through the
Board of Pardons.
DATED this

<^<

day of

/ ^ M ^ ^

V , 2 007.

BY THE COURT

ROBIN W. REESE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ANN ROZYCKL #7609
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666
Attorney General
160 East 300 South
PO BOX 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
Telephone. (801) 366-0199
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

AMENDED RESTITUTION ORDER
Criminal No. 031902822FS

RONALD R. RODRIGUES,

JUDGE: ROBIN W. REESE

Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing on the State's Motion to Amend Restitution Judgment
and Request for Hearing. The State was present and represented by Aim Rozycki, Assistant
Attorney General. The Defendant was not transported from the Utah State Prison, but was
represented by Michael D. Misner, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. Having heard from
the parties and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. The restitution judgment in favor of the State of Utah previously ordered in this case
on March 19, 2007, is hereby amended to reflect

the total amount of $65,403.66 to be

distributed as follows:
To Michelle Rodngues

$34,722.70

To Jennifer Falsone

$19,778.44

To State (for public assistance provided
to Jennifer Falsone
2.

$ 10,902.52

The Defendant's is granted 30 days from August 16, 2007, to file a Motion to

Withdraw his guilty plea if he believes he has a basis to do so.

Dated this

2P

day of

, 2007

fWZ
ROBIN W. REESE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGl
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2007)
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria

(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-3 8a-102(14)
and in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria
and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5).

(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and courtordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all
losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or
within one year after sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part,
the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.

(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution,
the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.

(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly
harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the
court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
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(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to
physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in
bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to theft
of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and
were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death
of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution,
the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method
of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate.
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time
of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing.
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one year
after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer am order
of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2003)
77-1-6 Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) fo have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(0 lo a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense
is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court
permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the
costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his
wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of
an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (2003)
76-7-201 Criminal nonsupport.
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or children under
the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support of the spouse, child, or
children when any one of them:
(a) is in needy circumstances; or
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a source other than
the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor:
(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in this state, any other
state, or any court of the United States;
(b) committed the offense while residing outside of Utah; or
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months within any 24month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000.
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock whose
paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a civil suit.
(5) (a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an affirmative
defense that the accused is unable to provide support. Voluntary unemployment or
underemployment by the defendant does not give rise to that defense.
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file and serve on the prosecuting
attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim the affirmative defense of inability
to provide support. The notice shall specifically identify the factual basis for the defense
and the names and addresses of the witnesses who the defendant proposes to examine in
order to establish the defense.
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice described in Subsection (5)(b), or at
such other time as the court may direct, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve the
defendant with a notice containing the names and addresses of the witnesses who the
state proposes to examine in order to contradict or rebut the defendant's claim.
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements of Subsection (5)(b) or (5)(c) entitles the
opposing party to a continuance to allow for preparation. If the court finds that a party's
failure to comply is the result of bad faith, it may impose appropriate sanctions.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp 2007)
§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed— Civil
penalties—Hearing
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii)plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages,
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and
losses including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to
a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act.
(c)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal
activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of
them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(c) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;

(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement,
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the
criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act.
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order
the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the
defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state
at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental
transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear
a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single
trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30,
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal
activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to
any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for
costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless
otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall

pay restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional
facility before and after sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the
county correctional facility; and
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under
Section 64-Be-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in
Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102.
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the daily inmate
incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional
facility.
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable
accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as
defined and covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C, 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental health treatment for
the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this
Subsection (6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution,
the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through
(iv) and shall enter the reason for its order on the record.
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the
county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of
incarceration under Subsection (6)(a).

Utah R. Crhn. P. 22(a)
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days
after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant,
otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue
or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make
a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be
given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence.

Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 30(b)

Rule 30. Errors and defects.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at
any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.

Utah Const, art. I, sec. 12
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function
of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.

U.S. Const, amend. V

Amendment 5 - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings. Ratified
12/15/1791.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or properly, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.

U. S. Constitution Amendment XIV
Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868.
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.

